Louisiana Law Review
Volume 14 | Number 1
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1952-1953 Term
December 1953

The Proposed Louisiana Code of Practice: A
Synthesis of Anglo-American and Continental
Civil Procedures
Henry G. McMahon

Repository Citation
Henry G. McMahon, The Proposed Louisiana Code of Practice: A Synthesis of Anglo-American and Continental Civil Procedures, 14 La. L.
Rev. (1953)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol14/iss1/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

The Proposed Louisiana Code of
Practice: A Synthesis of Anglo-American

and Continental Civil Procedures*
Henry G. McMahont
INTRODUCTION

For the past century and a half Louisiana has been a veritable laboratory of comparative law. Its juridical heritage from
France and Spain, and its acquisition by the United States,
precipitated an immediate struggle for supremacy between the
Roman and English systems of law. Louisiana's admission to
the North American union required adoption of the constitutional and public law of America. A flourishing trade and
commercial intercourse with its sister states made the adoption
of Anglo-American commercial law expedient. The failure of
the Louisiana Legislature, in 1824, to adopt Edward Livingston's
enlightened penal code resulted in a juridical vacuum which
the Anglo-American common law of crimes and criminal procedure found it relatively easy to fill. But in the extremely
important area of private law the Roman law system emerged
triumphant: the civilian customs and institutions of the former
colony were retained and perpetuated through the adoption
of the Louisiana Civil Codes of 1808 and 1825, the latter modeled
upon the Code Napoleon. A lesser victory was scored by the
Roman system in the field of civil procedure, where Livingston
skillfully blended continental procedural principles with judicial
administrative provisions of Anglo-American origin.
Competition between these two great legal systems did not
end, however, With this early demarcation of spheres of in* This article is a condensation and revision of the paper, bearing
the same title, which was read on October 8, 1953, at the International
Congress
lished in

of Civil Procedure in Vienna, Austria, and which will be pubAtti del Congresso Internazionale di Diritto Processuale Civile.

An Italian translation of the original paper will appear in an early issue
of JUS, published by the UniversitA Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, in Milan.
t Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Coordinator and Reporter, Code of Practice Revision, Louisiana State Law Institute.

1953]

PROPOSED LOUISIANA CODE OF PRACTICE

37

fluence. The training of Louisiana lawyers in the national law
schools of America, the ultimate loss by the Louisiana lawyer
of the ability to read French and Spanish, and the greater availability of American legal literature, all permitted the influence
of Anglo-American law to erode the civil law and procedure
of the state. These inroads of the English common law, however, were the result of interstitial seepage between the provisions of the positive law of Louisiana, rather than an undermining of its foundations. In due time a reaction was to set in.
The great improvement in legal education in Louisiana,
which commenced roughly thirty years ago, brought an almost
immediate revival of interest in its civil law and procedure.
The publication of law reviews by the three law schools of
the state provided, for the first time, the scholarly research
and doctrinal writings so necessary to the sustenance of any
civilian system. A decade or so later, the Louisiana State Law
Institute was established as the official research and legal reform agency of the state, with generous support from public
funds. The Institute, utilizing as it does the combined knowledge and energies of the judiciary, the practicing lawyers, and
the law faculties, has given a tremendous impetus to law reform and improvement. Since its creation in 1938, it has produced a compiled edition of the Louisiana civil codes, and
drafted one of the most advanced criminal codes in America,
which was officially adopted in 1942.'1 Despite the curtailment
of manpower during World War II, by 1949 the Institute completed a projet of all the miscellaneous statutes of the state,
which was adopted by the Legislature as the Louisiana Revised
Statutes of 1950. Since that time, the Institute has been engaged, under a mandate from the Legislature,12 in preparing
projets of a new Civil Code and a new Code of Practice for
1. La. Act 43 of 1942. Some indication of the merit of the Louisiana
Criminal Code of 1942, and of the reception which it will enjoy eventually
throughout America, is gleaned from the appraisal of the Louisiana Code

by the Wisconsin Legislative Council, which has just completed a study
of the various criminal codes and statutes in the drafting of its own code.

"The criminal statutes of other states were examined for new ideas in
organization as well as substance. As far as the American states are concerned, this venture with one exception proved to be generally unprofitable.
The exception is Louisiana. That state had a thorough going revision of
its criminal statutes in 1942, and we are indebted to the Louisiana code
for many of our ideas on form, organization, and substance." 7 Reports

of the Wisconsin Legislative Council ii (1950).
2. La. Act 335 of 1948 directed the Louisiana State Law Institute "to
prepare comprehensive [projetsd for the revision of the Civil Code of

Louisiana and for the revision of the Code of Practice of Louisiana."
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Louisiana. The first of these projects will probably require an
additional fifteen years; the new procedural code should be
completed in time for legislative adoption in the early part
of 1955. In view of the possibility of early completion of the
new Code of Practice, the bulk of the energies of the staff
and Council of the Law Institute are now being concentrated
upon this work.
The work which the Louisiana State Law Institute is doing
in the drafting of the projet of a new Code of Practice is much
more extensive than a mere revision of the former procedural
code. True, those principles and devices of its old procedure
which have proven effective and workable in actual practice
will be retained. But the improvements in procedure achieved
under the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, by the most
recent procedural codes of the various American states, and
by the more advanced Codes of Civil Procedure of continental
countries are being carefully studied, with a view of improving
Louisiana's procedure through a borrowing of the more effective
principles and devices of other states and countries. More than
any other American code, the new Code of Practice of Louisiana will be a product of comparative research and of the comparative method.
Procedure is only the means of enforcing and implementing
the substantive law of the particular jurisdiction. To perform
its proper role, therefore, it must be correlated to the substantive law which it must enforce. As the substantive law of Louisiana is partly of Roman and partly of English origin, it is not
surprising to find that in the past its civil procedure has been
a blend of continental and Anglo-American procedures.
An appraisal of the future procedural system, which will be
ushered in with the adoption of the new Louisiana Code of
Practice, and an evaluation of the contributions which will be
made thereto by both continental and Anglo-American civil
procedures, are the objects of the present paper. Such an analysis, however, would be impossible without some mention of the
various procedural systems in effect in Louisiana in the past.
We must address ourselves initially, therefore, to a brief consideration of these procedural systems.
THE LOUISIANA

PROCEDURAL SYSTEMS PRIOR TO

1825

Though France claimed the vast Louisiana territory as
early as 1682, by virtue of the explorations of La Salle, no

1953]

PROPOSED LOUISIANA CODE OF PRACTICE

39

serious effort was made to colonize any part of the vast expanse
until 1699, when d'Iberville set up the first settlement on the
coast of the Gulf of Mexico. No civil government worthy of
the name was established until 1712, when the colony was
granted to Crozat. Under the latter's charter, it was provided
that the Custom of Paris-that most interesting combination
of Germanic custom and Roman law which had been codified
in the sixteenth century-should be in effect throughout the
territory. The expenses of colonization proved too great a drain
upon the resources of even the immensely wealthy Crozat, so
that in 1717 he was compelled to surrender his charter. Thereupon, a grant of the colony was made to John Law's Company
of the West, under a charter which confirmed the applicability
of the Custom of Paris to the Louisiana territory. After the
bankruptcy of the Company of the West in 1732, the French
monarch was forced to take over the Louisiana territory as a
crown colony; but until the Spanish took possession of Louisiana under the cession of 1762, the Custom of Paris continued
to be the basic private law of the 3colony, modified slightly from
time to time by royal ordinances.
The judicial system of Louisiana may be said to have been
founded during the Crozat administration, with the establishment of the Superior Council as the first court of the territory.'
The procedure employed in civil cases in the Superior Council
of the colony was based primarily upon the four titles of the
Custom of Paris relating to real actions, actions generally, arrests
and executions, and the seizure and sale of movables. Otherwise, the procedure applicable was that employed in cases before the Ch~telet of Paris. From an examination of Pigeau's
work on the subject,6 it appears that the procedure of the
Ch~telet was based largely upon the Ordonnance Civile of 1667,
Louis XIV's famed procedural code, generally regarded as the
foundation of the present French Code of Civil Procedure.
Few lawyers were to be found in the colony at this time,
and little litigation occurred during this period of French domin3. For interesting accounts of this period of the legal history of Louisiana, see Henry P. Dart, Courts and Law in Colonial Louisiana, 22 La.
Bar Ass'n Rep. 17 (1921), 4 La. Hist. Q. 255 (1922); Wigmore, Louisiana:

The Story of Its Legal System, 1 So. L.Q. 1 (1916).
4. Henry P. Dart, Courts and Law in Colonial Louisiana, 22 La. Bar
Ass'n Rep. 17, 25 (1921), 4 La. Hist. Q. 261, 265 (1922).
5. See Titles 4, 5, 8, and 16, Coutfime de Paris.

6. Pigeau, La procedure du Chbtelet de Paris (1787).
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ion. This procedural system thus failed to make any lasting
impression upon the small population, with the result that
French civil procedure played a relatively minor role in shaping
the adjective law of Louisiana.
Under the secret Treaty of Fontainebleau in 1762, France
ceded the entire Louisiana territory to Spain. The latter's initial
attempt, under the timid de Ulloa, to take possession of the
colony three years later resulted in resistance from the French
colonists, which permitted Louisiana to remain under the de
facto control of the French commander until 1769. In that year,
Don Alejandro O'Reilly took possession of the territory with
a strong Spanish force, ruthlessly punished the leaders of the
resistance, and firmly established Spanish rule over the colony.
His first official acts were proclamations issued in the name of
His Most Catholic Majesty, abolishing the colonial government, establishing the new Spanish Province of Louisiana, abrogating French law in the colony, and establishing a short code
of laws for the people. This code 7 was intended only for temporary use, and only until the colonists could become more
familiar with the laws of Spain.
The judicial system created under O'Reilly's Proclamation
consisted of regional trial courts throughout the territory under
Alcaldes Ordinary, with an appeal in petty cases to the Cabildo,
or municipal council of New Orleans, and in the more important cases to the Audiencia in Havana, with the Council of the
Indies in Spain as the appellate court of last resort.
Annexed to the brief code embodied in O'Reilly's Proclamation was a set of "instructions as to the manner of instituting
suits, civil and criminal, and of pronouncing judgments in
general,"8 compiled by two of the Spanish lawyers on O'Reilly's
staff. The headnote thereon evidences the fact that both
O'Reilly's "code" and the instructions annexed thereto were
based upon the Recopilaci6n de las Indias, the great digest of
the laws and regulations enacted by Spain during the preceding
centuries for the people of their colonial empire, and the Recopilaci6n de Castilla. Both of these latter codes contained references to the monumental C6digo de las Siete Partidas and
the Nueva Recopilaci6n de las Leyes de Espafia, as well as to
7. See Ordinances and Instructions of Don Alexander O'Reilly, in 1
Louisiana Law Journal, No. 2, p. 1 (1841).
8. 1 Louisiana Law Journal, No. 2, p. 27 (1841).
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the earlier Spanish codifications, the Fuero Real, the Fuero
Viejo de Castilla, and even to the ancient Forum Juzgo. From
the numerous citations of these Spanish codes by the courts
of Louisiana during the initial period of American dominion,
it seems reasonable to conclude that the colonial lawyers were
completely familiar therewith. The same evidence indicates
that the works of Gregario L6pez, 9 of Hevia Bolafios, 10 and of
Febrero" likewise were available, and were accepted as authoritative in procedural matters during the Spanish regime. Although Spain held the colony for little more than a third of a
century, its procedural law played an extremely important role
in shaping the subsequent civil procedure of Louisiana. 2
Under the secret treaty of San Ildefonso in 1800, Spain retroceded the Louisiana territory to France. The latter, however,
made no effort to regain possession of the colony until late in
1803. Prior to taking possession, France sold the entire territory to the United States of America, which assumed control
thereof on December 20, 1803.
As France exercised sovereignty over the colony in this
period for less than a month, no effort was made to abrogate
the Spanish laws then in force. The American government,
after taking over the colony, moved slowly in effecting changes
in the law of Louisiana. The former French colony was first
divided. That portion north of the present northern boundary
of the State of Louisiana was organized as the District, then
the Territory, of Louisiana, and finally as the Territory of Missouri. The remainder of the former colony, comprising all of
the present State of Louisiana except the West Florida Parishes, was organized as the Territory of Orleans. Three acts
9. Las Siete Partidas glosadas por el Lic. Gregario L6pez.
10. Hevia Bolafios, Curia Filipica.
11. Febrero, Libreria de escribanos.
12. Henry P. Dart, Civil Procedure in Louisiana under the Spanish
Regime, 12 La. Hist. Q. 33 (1929); Henry P. Dart, The Influence of the
Ancient Law of Spain in the Jurisprudence of Louisiana, 6 Tulane L. Rev.
83 (1931), 18 A.B.A.J. 125 (1931); Henry P. Dart, The Law Library of a
Louisiana Lawyer in the 18th Century, 25 La. Bar Ass'n Rep. 12 (1924);
Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law, 6 Tulane L. Rev. 280 (1932), 7
Tulane L. Rev. 82 (1932), 8 Tulane L. Rev. 396 (1934), and 9 Tulane L. Rev.
244 (1935).
For detailed accounts of the legal history of Louisiana during the
period of Spanish dominion, the reader is referred to Wigmore, Louisiana:

The Story of Its Legal System, 1 So. L. Q. 1 (1916); Henry P. Dart, The
Colonial Legal Systems of Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas, 12 A.B.A.J. 481
(1926); Henry P. Dart, Courts and Law in Colonial Louisiana, 22 La. Bar
Ass'n Rep. 17 (1921), 4 La. Hist. Q. 255 (1922); Henry P. Dart, The Place
of Civil Law in Louisiana, 4 Tulane L. Rev. 163 (1930).
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of the Congress of the United States affecting the latter territory were passed during the first two years after the Louisiana
Purchase. The first 13 left unchanged all of the laws then in
force, simply vesting the administrative power in different
officers. The second 14 and third15 of these congressional acts
reorganized the territorial government to conform to the American pattern, provided for the writ of habeas corpus and for trial
by jury, but expressly declared that all laws in force in the
territory should continue in effect until changed by subsequent
legislation.
The Legislative Council of the Territory of Orleans, empowered by Congress to legislate for this new American possession, made more significant changes almost immediately. The
Crimes Act of 180516 defined a large number of crimes and misdemeanors, repealed all prior criminal legislation, recognized
the accused's right to a trial by jury, and provided that all
such trials should be conducted according to the common law
of England. The most important of these early territorial statutes, subsequently known as the Practice Act of 1805,1" recognized the Superior Court of the Territory, previously established
in New Orleans by the territorial governor, and provided a simple
procedure for the trial of cases therein. A third act 18 divided
the territory into counties, created county and justice of the
peace courts, and adopted a simplified version of the procedure
embodied in the Practice Act of 1805 for the trial of cases in
these courts.
The Practice Act of 1805 merits extended consideration
here for at least two reasons. For one thing, it was the handiwork of the distinguished Edward Livingston, who, ruined financially by the defalcations of a subordinate while holding the
office of Mayor of New York, emigrated to Louisiana to regain
his fortune, subsequently became an enthusiastic convert to
the civil law, and led the fight for codification in Louisiana.
For another, important segments of the Louisiana Code of Practice of 1825 were taken bodily from the 1805 legislation.
13.
14.
15.
16.
c. L.
17.
18.

Act of October 31, 1803.
Act of March 26, 1804.
Act of March 2, 1805,
Acts of the Legislative Council of the Territory of Orleans of 1805,
Id. at c. XXVI.
Id. at c. XXV.
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The most radical changes made in the civil procedure of
Louisiana by the Practice Act of 1805 were the establishment
of the trial by jury, and the requirement that the testimony
of all available witnesses be taken in open court, with depositions permitted only for witnesses who were ill, aged, or beyond the control of the court. Other provisions established a
simplified form of pleading, created the provisional remedies
of attachment and arrest, provided for the enforcement of judgments under the writs of fieri facias and distringas, and authorized the court to issue writs of quo warranto, procedendo, mandamus, and prohibition. The statute went into great detail in
prescribing the form of citations, writs, and other mandates
to be issued by the court. As Livingston was a staunch disciple
of the great English reformer, Jeremy Bentham, the simplified
procedure embodied in the Practice Act of 1805 reflected Bentham's influence.
Considerable difference of opinion exists today as to the
source of this legislation. Mr. Benjamin Wall Dart, the distinguished editor of the latest editions of the present Louisiana
Code of Practice, and the son of Louisiana's leading legal historian, has voiced the opinion that the provisions of the Practice Act of 1805 "were in effect restatements of the Spanish
procedure with additions made necessary by the new order
resulting from France's transfer of Louisiana to the United
States."'19 On the other hand, America's most distinguished student of comparative civil procedure, Professor Robert Wyness
Millar of the Northwestern University School of Law, is of the
opinion that the Practice Act of 1805 was primarily a refinement and simplification of contemporary American chancery
practice,2 0 a view in which the present writer originally concurred.21 Further research by the writer over a period of years,
however, has convinced him that there is considerably more
validity to Mr. Dart's position than the writer had originally
thought.
A determination of the primary sources of the Practice
Act is made extremely difficult by the very fact which, paradoxically enough, appears to lend support to the views of both
19. Benjamin W. Dart, Introduction, Code of Practice of the State of
Louisiana v (2d ed., 1942).
20. Millar, The Fortunes of the Demurrer, 31 Ill.L. Rev. 596, 604 (1937).
21. The Exception of No Cause of Action in Louisiana, 9 Tulane L. Rev.
17, 19 (1934).
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Mr. Dart and Professor Millar: the striking similarity between

many aspects of Anglo-American chancery practice and Spanish
procedure. This is not surprising, in view of the fact that the

equity system of England for years was administered by the
ecclesiastics, who applied the procedural principles of canon
law in developing chancery practice. Since the adjective law
of Spain was also a legitimate descendant of Romano-canonical
law, many similarities of the two procedural systems are to

be expected.
The present writer has been unable to find any recorded

expressions of the views of Edward Livingston on the subject.
Fairly convincing evidence is available, however, to indicate
that the courts and legal profession of Louisiana regarded the

Practice Act of 1805 as being based primarily upon Spanish
procedure.
The last section of this 1805 statute2 .2 authorized the superior

court to issue writs of quo warranto, procedendo, mandamus, and
prohibition. The first year after the admission of Louisiana to
statehood, the newly created Supreme Court found it necessary
to determine whether the common law rules relating to man-

damus or the rules relating to its Spanish counterpart, incitativo, were applicable in Louisiana. In determining this issue,
23
the court observed:
"The common law names in judicial proceedings have naturally been adopted in a practice which is carried on in
the English language, but they ought to be considered rather
as a translation of the names formerly used, than as emanations from the English jurisprudence; the words mandamus, procedendo, certiorari, prohibition, &c., sometimes
employed in our practice, may be good equivalents for incitativo, evocacion, inhibicion, &c; but their adoption as words
can, by no rule of law, or common sense, be considered
as having introduced the English practice itself."
This was the language of a court composed, not exclusively of
native Louisianians who might be expected to be unsympathetic
to any attempt to supersede the Spanish procedural rules with
22. Acts of the Legislative Council of the Territory of Orleans of 1805,
c. XXV, § 22.
23. Agnes v. Judice, 3 Mart. (O.S.) 182, 185-186 (La. 1813).
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which they were familiar, but of a court having a majority of
its judges trained exclusively under the common law system.24
A later case, although decided three years after the end
of the period which we are now considering, in answering a
somewhat similar question, confirmed the judicial view quoted
above. In this later case, speaking through Justice Porter, the

court said: 26
"The repeal of laws is never presumed; and if the new
and old laws can stand together, they should be so construed. It would be going far, to hold that the special enactment of a remedy which previously existed, should
introduce the consequences that attended that remedy in
another system of jurisprudence. In this respect there is
a material difference between this case and that construction which should be given to our laws introducing jury
trial, and the writ of habeas corpus; for they being unknown
to our jurisprudence, the understanding of them was ex
necessitate, to be sought somewhere else. The use of common law terms is easily accounted for, in the desire of the
legislature to use those words which would convey in the
most clear and concise manner, to persons acquainted with
the English language alone, the remedies defined."
Louisiana was admitted as a member state of the North
American union in 1812, under a constitution adopted earlier
in that year. Neither this constitution nor the statutes implementing its provisions made any substantial changes in the
procedural law of Louisiana, other than the creation of a system
of courts based on the American pattern, and consisting of a
supreme court, district courts, and justice of the peace courts.
The Practice Act of 1805 remained in effect until its repeal when
the Code of Practice went into effect in 1825.
The civil procedure of Louisiana at the end of this period,
therefore, was based primarily upon the Spanish procedure in
force during the period of Spanish dominion. Two significant
changes had been made therein by the Practice Act: the adoption of the institution of jury trial; and the requirement that
24. The Supreme Court of Louisiana on the date this case was decided

was composed of three judges only: Chief Justice Dominick A. Hall, and
Associate Justices George Mathews and Pierre Derbigny. Henry P. Dart,
The History of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 133 La. xxx, xxxix (1913).
25. Abat v. Whitman, 7 Mart. (N.S.) 162 (La. 1828).
26. Id. at 163-164.
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the testimony of all available witnesses be given in open court.
The adoption of the common law rules of evidence followed in
the wake of the adoption of the jury trial almost as a necessary
consequence.2" The requirement of viva voce testimony in open
court resulted in the direct and cross-examination of witnesses
as under the English practice. As a result of these changes, the
trial of litigation in Louisiana, at least during this period, took
on the complexion of the common law trial. But otherwise,
except to the extent that it ran counter to the provisions of
the Practice Act and other legislation, Spanish influence upon
the civil procedure of the state during this period remained
paramount.
THE CODE OF PRACTICE OF

1825

Pursuant to a legislative resolution of March 14, 1822, L.
Moreau-Lislet, Edward Livingston, and Pierre Derbigny were
appointed as a committee to revise and amend the so-called
Civil Code of 1808,28 to prepare a commercial code, 29 and to
27. See Planters' Bank v. George, 6 Mart. (O.S.) 670, 12 Am. Dec.
487 (La. 1819).
28. It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the redaction
and adoption of the various civil codes of the state. For present purposes,
it suffices to point out that the so-called Civil Code of 1808, drafted by
Moreau-Lislet and James Brown to serve as a digest of the civil law in
force in the then Territory of Orleans, was based largely upon the Code
Napol6on or one of the initial drafts thereof, but contained provisions
of definitely Spanish origin. Why these commissioners, appointed to draft
a new code based upon the Spanish civil law then in force, turned to the
new French codification presents some interesting questions which cannot
be considered here. Probably the most logical explanation has been offered
by the writer's colleague, Professor Joseph Dainow of the Law Faculty
of Louisiana State University. The alternative to the compilation of a
completely new code based on Spanish civil law "which was closest to
the same basic legal patterns, and with many adaptations to more modern
and acceptable social and economic theories, was the French codification.
One of the most significant attributes of the French Civil Code was its
reflection of the new freedom of the Revolution. This was undoubtedly
one of the reasons for its influence and precept in so many countries all
over the world. Its use in Louisiana, in a place with such a strong French
background, was quite natural." Dainow, The Louisiana Civil Law, Civil
Code of Louisiana xiii, xviii (Dainow's ed., 1947).
The Civil Code of 1825, drafted by Livingston, Derbigny, and MoreauLislet, likewise was based upon the Code Napoleon or a draft thereof,
with adaptations to make it conform to use in Louisiana, an admixture of
Spanish civil law, and the inclusion of some of the legal philosophies of
Pothier, Domat, and possibly Toullier. On this point, see Tucker, Source
Books of Louisiana Law, 6 Tulane L. Rev. 280, 281-292 (1932), and authorities
cited therein; and Dainow, op cit. supra.
29. The pro jet of a Commercial Code, prepared by Livingston, was
in due course submitted to the Legislature, but never adopted. The resulting vacuum led to the jurisprudential adoption of Anglo-American commercial law, subsequently adopted as positive law through the enactment
of a number of comprehensive statutes on the various subjects thereof.
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submit "a treatise on the rules of civil actions and a system
of the practice to be observed before our courts. ' 30 No more
able a group of jurisconsults could have been selected for
these tasks. Livingston, who had come to Louisiana in 1804,
probably was the most distinguished American legal scholar
of his day, entirely familiar not only with the common law,
but with Roman, French, and Spanish law as well. Derbigny
had been an outstanding practitioner before the Spanish courts
of the colony, one of the first justices of the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, and subsequently Secretary of State and Governor.
Moreau-Lislet, a distinguished veteran of the colonial period,
had previously served as Attorney General of the state, and,
with Carleton Hunt, had prepared the first English translation
of the Siete Partidas.
Early in 1823, the three redactors submitted to the Legislature the projet of the new procedural code, which was subsequently approved and went into effect in 1825. This Code of
Practice, in form and arrangement, was typically civilian, consisting of eleven hundred and fifty-five articles numbered consecutively and divided into titles, chapters, and sections. As
Colonel Tucker, the distinguished President of the Louisiana
State Law Institute, has pointed out, it was "the product of
a mixture of French, Spanish, and Roman law elements, to'3 1
gether with common law elements of English origin. .
The draftsmen of this procedural code, in the comments in
their projet,3 not only gave their reasons for the adoption of
controversial devices and principles, but listed the sources of
the more important articles of the code. An examination of
these source notes is extremely interesting. The direct Roman
influence was slight, only eight references having been made
to the Digest and three to the Institutes, all in the title dealing
with actions. Spanish procedural law, as might be expected,
served as the basis of a number of extremely important segments of the new codification, with sixty-three references to
the Spanish codes and procedure writers. There must be considered in this connection, however, the forty-five references to
30. The

legislative resolution is reprinted

in Tucker, Source Books

of Louisiana Law, 6 Tulane L. Rev. 280, 286-287 (1932).
31. Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law, 7 Tulane L. Rev. 82, 85
(1932).
32. The projets of the Code of Practice and Civil Code of 1825 have
been officially reprinted by the State of Louisiana as Volumes 1 and 2 of

the Louisiana Legal Archives (1937).
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the Practice Act of 1805 (the majority of which in turn were
bottomed upon Spanish procedure), and the sixty-nine references to Louisiana statutes (a few of which were predicated
on general concepts of Spanish law). French procedural theory,
which had played a rather negligible role in the preceding era,
increased its influence upon the adoption of the Code of Practice. Thirty references in the redactors' source notes were to
the works of French commentators, with the more important
and indirect influence reflected through the twenty-six references to the Civil Code of 1808, which was based largely upon
the Code Napol6on.
The Spanish procedural law constituting direct sources of
the procedural code was drawn principally from the Siete Partidas, and the procedural works of Febrero and Hevia Bolafios.
The writings of Domat and Pothier constituted the direct borrowings from French pre-code procedural theory. Important
segments of Louisiana's procedural law, such as succession procedure, reflected the indirect influence of French procedure.
One of the deficiencies of the redactors' source notes is that
very few references to Anglo-American law are listed, although
even a cursory examination of this code indicates quite clearly
that the Anglo-American contribution, though lesser than the
Romanistic one, was considerable. Some idea of the relative
weight thereof can be gleaned from the brief analysis of Louisiana's first procedural code which follows.
Procedural concepts and devices which reflected the primary influence of continental law include the code provisions
relating to actions generally; real actions; jurisdiction; demand
and incidental demands; cumulation of actions; consolidation
of actions; pleading (including the exceptions); the provisional
remedies of arrest, sequestration, provisional seizure and injunction; interrogatories on facts and articles; contestatio litis; real
tenders; judgments; nullity and rescission of judgments; ordinary,
summary, and executory processes; and succession procedure.
The primary influence of Anglo-American law was reflected
in the code provisions relating to judicial administration (composition of courts, functions of judicial officers, assignment and
continuance of cases, et cetera), the provisional remedy of
attachment, 33 production of evidence, trial of cases (including
33. Attachment on mesne process, though not of common law, is of
English origin. For an interesting account of its development, its obso-
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trial by jury), new trial, execution of judgments (particularly the enforcement of moneyed judgments), and the extraordinary remedies. Both systems of procedural law appear to
have contributed to the code provisions relating to citation and
service of process, depositions, appellate procedure, and proceedings before justice of the peace courts.
We have seen heretofore that, under the Practice Act of
1805, the institution of jury trial had been adopted, and that
this led to the jurisprudential adoption of the common law rules
of evidence. Under the Anglo-American system, the appellate
court reviewed only questions of law and ordinarily could not
reverse the jury verdict on factual issues; under the continental
system, the appellate court reviewed both legal and factual
issues, as presented by the record. A compromise had been
effected for the Superior Court of the Territory of Orleans: the
court reviewed issues of law on appeal, and if any appellate
review of factual questions was desired, the case was completely retried by a new jury selected in the appellate court.
Very shortly after Louisiana's admission to the Union, its
Supreme Court held that, under the Constitution of 1812, no
retrial of a factual issue could be had before a new jury. 34
This was followed shortly by a decision35 holding that the appellate court could review the transcript of the evidence presented
in the trial court, to determine the correctness of the jury's
findings of fact. The principle of appellate review of the facts
thus adopted was repeatedly affirmed by the court, 36 and was
confirmed in subsequent constitutions of the state, at first impliedly3 7 and then expressly."'
The effects of these decisions, which did not make themlescence in England, and its general use throughout the American states, see
Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective 481-497

(1952).
34. Syndics of Brooks v. Weyman, 3 Mart. (O.S.)
35. Abat v. Doliolle, 4 Mart. (O.S.) 316 (La. 1816).

9 (La. 1813).

36. In Martineau v. Hooper, 8 Mart. (O.S.) 699 (La. 1820); Mitchel v.
Jewel, 10 Mart. (O.S.) 645 (La. 1822); Morris v. Hatch, 2 Mart. (N.S.) 491
(La. 1824); See also Scott v. Turnbull, 10 Mart. (O.S.) 335 (La. 1821); Dunn
& Wife v. Duncan's Heirs, 10 Mart. (O.S.) 671 (La. 1822); La Pointe v.
Guidry, 7 La. 246 (1834); Montgomery v. Russell, 10 La. 330 (1836); Williams
v. Lanier, 14 La. 210 (1839); Hood v. McCorkle, 16 La. 240 (1840); Nott &
Co. v. Kirkman, 19 La. 14 (1841).
The subject is discussed in an interesting manner in Brumfield, Louisiana Practice-Trial De Novo on Appeal, Proceed. of N.A.C.C.A. 560 (1951).
37. Cf. Art. 63, La. Const. of 1845; Art. 62, La. Const. of 1852; Art. 70,
La. Const. of 1864; Art. 74, La. Const. of 1868.
38. Art. 81, La. Const. of 1879; Art. 85, La. Const. of 1898; Arts. 85, 95,

La. Const of 1913; Art. 7, §§ 10, 29, La. Const. of 1921.
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selves evident for some years, were to prove far-reaching. As
the appellate courts were free to substitute their findings on
factual issues for the trial jury's verdict, and not infrequently
did so, jury trials in civil cases ultimately were had with relative infrequence. As a result, the technique of applying the
common law rules of evidence completely changed in the vast
majority of civil cases. Instead of being used to determine the
admissibility of evidence sought to be presented to the lay
jury, they were now used by the trial judge, skilled through
experience in the marshalling and evaluation of evidence, to
weigh evidence, usually admitted subject to the objections urged.
In the area of the trial, continental procedure had regained
much of the ground previously lost to Anglo-American procedure; and if the former did not emerge triumphant, at least
it effectively neutralized much of the latter's earlier victory.
The influence of Anglo-American procedure, however, continued to increase during this period, as a reading knowledge
of Spanish and French grew rarer in the profession, and AngloAmerican legal literature became increasingly available. Members of the Louisiana Bench and Bar began to turn to English
and American cases and the common law writers for guidance.
The courts in this period occasionally invoked the dubious aid
of Anglo-American precedents in the solution of procedural
problems really calling for the application of the principles of
continental civil procedure. Not a great deal of damage was
done thereby, but this interstitial seepage subsequently was
to pave the way for an increased reception of Anglo-American
procedural law.
THE CODE OF PRACTICE OF

1870

The purposes of the revision of Louisiana's two codes following the Civil War were the elimination of all references therein to the institution of slavery, and the integration therein of all
related special procedural legislation adopted since 1825. The
Code of Practice of 1870 went no further than this, and did
little to change the civil procedure of Louisiana.
Important changes, however, were otherwise brought about
during this period. The former judicial view that common law
terms in the procedural code and statutes were to be regarded
merely as translations of the names of their continental counter-
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parts 9 now yielded to an excessively generous evaluation of
the common law contribution to the procedure of the state, 40
and increased resort to the legal compendia then being published in America.
The American code procedure movement, which was ushered
in by New York's adoption of the David Dudley Field Code of
Procedure in 1848, and which spread rapidly throughout America
during the period now under consideration, had much to do in
extending the influence of Anglo-American procedure over
Louisiana practice. Paradoxically enough, the initial flow of
influence was reversed, for it was the Louisiana Code of Practice of 1825 which provided the inspiration for the Field Code;
and "from it very many of the best portions of the Field Code
were adopted. 4 1 In time, the current reversed directions.
The Field Code, figuratively speaking, was a protest against
the complexities and technicalities of contemporary AngloAmerican procedure. It unified common law procedure and
chancery practice as far as was then practicable, and it sought
to eliminate unnecessary technicalities and to simplify procedure.
But it was a procedural system designed to implement AngloAmerican law, and consequently was an Anglo-American code;
and it, and its offspring in the various American states, had to
be interpreted and applied largely by lawyers still dominated
by the procedural philosophies of the old system. Considering
the background of these American procedure codes, cases interpreting their provisions should never have been accepted by the
Louisiana courts in the solution of the procedural problems of
Louisiana; but unfortunately they were.
The system of pleading developed by these American codes
was intended to require brief, simple statements of the controlling facts on which each litigant's position was based. As ultimately developed by judicial interpretation, there evolved a
system of pleading rules almost as technical as the common
law rules which they displaced. No lessening of the importance
of the role played by pleading in Anglo-American procedure
resulted from the adoption of American code pleading. In the
39. Agnes v. Judice, 3 Mart. (O.S.) 182 (La. 1813); Abat v. Whitman,
7 Mart. (N.S.) 162 (La. 1828).
40. See, for instance, Gill v. City of Lake Charles, 119 La. 17, 43 So.
897 (1907), and the writer's criticism thereof in Parties Litigant in Louisiana-III, 13 Tulane L. Rev. 385, 391-396 (1939).
41. Clark on Code Pleading 28, n. 70 (1947); 19 A.B.A. Ass'n Rep. 427
(1896); 54 Albany L.J. 198, 204 (1896).
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present writer's opinion, the Louisiana courts adopted the system of "fact pleading" of the American codes shortly after the
turn of the twentieth century, through acceptance of the judicial decisions of the various American states on the subject.
The original simplicity of the system of pleading in the Louisiana Code of Practice of 1825 gradually ossified into a harsher
and more technical system, with penalties for a breach of what
actually were rules of judicial etiquette ranging from timeconsuming amendments of the pleadings to the more drastic
dismissal of the suit. This system of pleading obtains today in
Louisiana, although in recent years its rigors have been mitigated appreciably by the commendably liberal attitude of the
42
Louisiana courts.
At just about the same time that the rules of fact pleading
were received in Louisiana, the common law rules of joinder
of parties effected a partial entry into the jurisprudence of the
state. The provisions of the Codes of Practice relating to cumulation of actions, taken directly from Spanish procedure, as the
redactors' source notes indicate, contained no requirement of
connexity with respect to subjective cumulation (litis consortium). The early Louisiana jurisprudence had solved the
problem through the jurisprudential adoption of the requirement of a common interest, or community of interest, between
the plaintiffs joining, or the defendants joined, in the suitsubstantially the same concept as the "community of jural interest" of the German Code of Civil Procedure. 43 In 1909,
objection was raised by the defendant in a case to the union of
actions by a plurality of plaintiffs .44 The result reached by the
court was completely sound, and thoroughly harmonious both
with the earlier jurisprudence of the state and with generally
accepted continental principles of subjective cumulation. However, three gratuitous and erroneous observations were voiced
in the opinion, to the effect that: (1) Spanish and French procedure had no rules which would afford any solution of the problem presented; (2) the early Louisiana jurisprudential rules
on the subject were derived from Anglo-American procedure;
42. On this subject, the reader is referred to the writer's article on
The Case Against Fact Pleading in Louisiana, 13 Louisiana Law Review
369 (1953). The opposing view is presented in Tucker, Proposal for Retention of the Louisiana System of Fact Pleading; Expos6 des Motifs, 13
Louisiana Law Review 395 (1953).
43. Section 59.
44. Gill v. City of Lake Charles, 119 La. 17, 43 So. 897 (1907).

1953]

PROPOSED LOUISIANA CODE OF PRACTICE

53

and (3) a resort should be made "to the books of the common
law" for aid in the solution of related problems. 45 Since the
only non-Louisiana authorities cited in this opinion were equity
precedents applying the negative test of multifariousness, based
upon the same Romano-canonical principles which constitute
the source of continental rules of cumulation of actions, it
seems clear that the court did not intend to invite a resort to
the applicable common law rules, but rather to the pertinent
rules of chancery practice. Subsequent cases, 46 however, misconstrued the quoted language as vouching for the acceptability
in Louisiana of the common law rules of joinder of parties,
which were designed to implement attributes of the common
law joint, several, and joint and several, obligations-concepts
completely alien to the civil law of Louisiana. Not too much
damage has been done as yet through the application of these
common law procedural rules in isolated cases, but the poten47
tialities of further damage are alarming.
The adoption, since 1870, of a small number of procedural
statutes has further increased the content of Anglo-American
procedure in Louisiana practice. Limitations of space permit
the writer to refer only to the most important of these legislative acts.
The code provisions relating to injunctions originally were
taken indirectly from French procedure, through the medium
of provisions of the Civil Code of 1808. With the rapid social
and economic development in Louisiana during the past four
decades, this injunction procedure had proven inadequate, and
even anachronistic. Considerable improvement in the injunction
practice had been made in prior years in several American
jurisdictions. The injunction practice in the federal courts particularly had been improved through the adoption of a statute
drafted by an extremely able congressional committee after an
extended study of the subject. In 1924, Louisiana adopted a
statute4 8 regulating the issuance of interlocutory injunctions,
45. Ibid.
46. Dubuisson v. Long, 175 La. 564, 143 So. 494 (1932);

Gates v. Bisso

Ferry Co., 172 So. 829 (La. App. 1937); Delesdernier Estate v. Zettwoch, 175
So. 137 (La. App. 1937).
47. The writer has discussed these cases, and the potential problems
presented thereby, in his article on Parties Litigant in Louisiana-III, 13
Tulane L. Rev. 385 (1939).
48. La. Act 29 of 1924, now La. R. S. 1950, 13:4062-4067. For the reasons
for the adoption of this legislation, see Spencer, Discussion of Act 29 of
1924, Relating to Writs of Injunction, 26 La. Bar Ass'n Rep. 15 (1925).
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which was taken almost verbatim from this federal statute.
The adoption of this legislation, and the gradual reception of
equity principles relating to the issuance of injunctions which
occurred both before and after this enactment, have resulted
in an injunction procedure virtually of Anglo-American origin.
THE PROPOSED NEW CODE OF PRACTICE

The expansion of the judicial systems of America during
the past half-century has not kept pace with the increase of
wealth, the growth of population, and the economic development of the country. As a consequence, the large increase in
litigation threw an almost unbearable burden upon these judicial systems, which aggravated the congestion of their dockets
and delayed unreasonably the disposition of cases. The problem has not been as acute in Louisiana as in other American
jurisdictions, where jury trials have impeded the expeditious
dispatch of judicial business. It is present, however, to some
extent in this state, and the rapid industrial development of
Louisiana during and since World War II warns of its aggravation in the near future, unless proper measures to meet it
are taken timely.
In all American jurisdictions during recent years there has
been a quickening of interest in judicial administration and
civil procedure. The more expeditious dispatch of judicial business has been needed urgently, and with this need came the
realization generally that it could be met only through more
effective judicial administration, and the simplification of procedure through the elimination of unnecessary delays and technicalities.
These mounting pressures resulted in the adoption, by the
Supreme Court of the United States under legislative authority, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which went into
effect in 1938. These rules made a number of radical changes
not only in federal practice, but in generally accepted procedural philosophies of America. The more important concrete
changes made by these Federal Rules include: the unification
of law and equity in the federal courts, though the constitutional right to a jury trial in an action at law has been preserved; the grant of the broadast judicial discretion to the trial
judge; the simplification of pleading; the broadening of the
rules respecting joinder of actions and parties; the adoption of
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an effective system of discovery to permit a party to ascertain
prior to trial the evidence available to his adversary; and the
adoption of pretrial procedure to permit the trial judge, at a
conference with the opposing attorneys in advance of trial,
to formulate and narrow the issues to be presented on the trial.
Under these rules, the "sporting concept" of common law procedure has been jettisoned. No longer, at least in the federal
courts, will a law suit be a duel between skilled protagonists.
The impact of this new procedural system upon the various
American jurisdictions has been both immediate and significant. Six of the American states have already adopted, either
verbatim or in substance, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
and a larger number of American jurisdictions have borrowed
some of the more effective procedural devices embodied therein. 49
Yet only fifteen years have elapsed since they went into effect.
Even this early, it is safe to state that the Federal Rules have
altered the procedural thinking of the legal profession in
America.
Since this new procedure is based largely upon the former
chancery practice in the federal courts, it has effected a closer
approach to continental civil procedure. Even more of a factor
in bringing this new procedural system closer to continental
ideas of procedure, however, has been the changed procedural
philosophy which is its real foundation.
A new Code of Practice probably would have been enacted
in Louisiana even if the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had
not been adopted, as plans for this revision had been projected
earlier, and the establishment of the Louisiana State Law Institute in 1938 made the execution of these plans feasible. But
the adoption of the new Federal Rules has virtually guaranteed
Louisiana a more liberal and effective procedural code of its
own than otherwise would have been possible.
Actual work by the Louisiana State Law Institute on its
legislative mandate to prepare a projet of the new Code of
Practice commenced late in 1950, with the appointment of three
Reporters therefor and the selection of a research staff to assist
them. The Reporters appointed were Professor Leon D. Hubert,
49. The

tremendous

influence which

the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-

cedure have had already upon the civil procedures of the various American
states is indicated by Chief Justice Vanderbilt of the Supreme Court of
New Jersey in his work, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration
(1949), passim.
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Jr., of the Tulane University College of Law faculty, Professor Leon Sarpy of the law faculty of Loyola University, and
the writer, who was designated as Coordinator of the revision.
Each of the Reporters taught the courses in Louisiana Practice
at his respective institution, and each had had more than eleven
years of practice before entering the teaching profession.
The first six months were spent in the determination of
questions of general policy, and in the preparation of a tentative outline of the proposed new code. Consideration was given
initially to the possibility of basing the code upon the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, but this alternative was rejected
because of the need for a procedural system correlated to the
civil law of the state. The final decision was to retain the basic
procedure of Louisiana, but to borrow freely from other systems, in those areas where the state's procedure either had no
counterparts of the particular principle or device borrowed, or
less effective ones. The modus operandi of the drafting and
consideration of proposed new articles adopted was patterned
upon that employed successfully by the Law Institute in the
redaction of the Criminal Code of 1942: the initial draft of the
various titles by the Reporters, consideration thereof by advisory committees of judges and practicing lawyers, redrafts to
embody the suggestions and criticism of the committees, consideration thereof by the Council of the Law Institute, redrafts
to reflect the action of that body, consideration thereof by the
membership of the Institute and the profession generally, and
final action thereafter by the Council. To date, roughly sixty
per cent of the work on the new code has been completed.
At the outset, a tentative outline of the proposed code 5° was
prepared by the Reporters to serve as a comprehensive blue
print of the project. This outline, which has not been changed
materially in the progress of the Institute's work, indicates
a code of the conventional civilian pattern, divided into books,
titles, chapters, sections, and articles numbered consecutively.
Its subject arrangement is based largely upon the present Code
of Practice, but to some extent has been influenced by the arrangement of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure. The initial
book, captioned "Preliminary Titles," includes the four titles
on General Dispositions, Courts, Civil Actions, and Parties.
50. For a more detailed breakdown of subject matter, see the Louisiana
State Law Institute's pamphlet, Tentative Outline of the Proposed Code of
Practice (May 8, 1952).
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Book H, "Rules of Pleading and Practice in Ordinary Process,"
is composed of titles on Pleading, Citation and Service of Process, Production of Evidence, Pretrial Procedure, Trial, and
Judgments. The third book, "Proceedings in Appellate Courts,"
contains only two titles, on Appellate Procedure, and Supervisory Procedure. It was not deemed necessary to subdivide
Book IV, on "Execution of Judgments," into titles. Book V,
"Summary and Executory Processes," is divided into titles on
Summary Process, and on Executory Process. The sixth book,
on "Probate Procedure," is divided into seven titles: General
Dispositions, Intestate Successions, Testate Successions, Partition
of Successions, Ancillary Probate Procedure, Administration of
Small Successions, and Separation of Patrimony. The final book
integrates into the new Code of Practice important segments
of procedural law which heretofore have been contained principally in the Civil Code or in special statutes. This Book VII,
"Special Proceedings," includes titles on Provisional Remedies,
Real Actions, Extraordinary Remedies, Domestic Relations Cases
(divorce, separation, annulment), Personal Status Cases (emancipation, tutorship, interdiction, curatorship), Partition between
Co-owners, Concursus Proceedings, Ancillary Remedies of Creditors, Receivership, Eviction, and Procedure in Courts of Limited Jurisdiction.
A considerable number of borrowings from the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure will be made by Louisiana's new procedural code. Of these, probably the most important is discovery
procedure. Despite the advanced position of several of the continental procedural codes on this subject, 51 prior to 1952 virtually
the only counterpart of this device in Louisiana was interrogatories on facts and articles, 5,2 taken originally from French procedure to secure admissions from the opposing litigant in the
period when parties otherwise were incompetent to testify. So
great was the professional demand for discovery in the state,
that as soon as the Law Institute had completed its work upon
this section of the new code early in 1952, an informal request
was made for the drafting of a proposed statute embodying
the contemplated code provisions. This request was complied
51. On this subject, see Millar, The Mechanism of Fact-Discovery: A
Study in Comparative Civil Procedure, 32 Iii. L. Rev. 261 (1937).
52. Craig, Discovery Procedure and Its Louisiana Counterparts, 2 LouisiANA LAW REVIEW 525 (1940).
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with,5 3 and shortly thereafter, in the legislative session of 1952,
the proposed statute was adopted.5 4 The new Louisiana discovery
procedure is substantially the pertinent provisions of the Federal
Rules, with slight changes made to adapt them for local use.
An informal legislative request for the drafting of a pro55
posed statute on pretrial procedure likewise was complied with,
which similarly was adopted by the Legislature in 1952,56 making
Louisiana's pretrial procedure substantially identical with Federal Rule 16.
The third party practice of the Federal Rules also will be
incorporated into the new Code of Practice as an incidental
demand, replacing the call in warranty, originally derived from
French procedure. The fourth important borrowing by the
proposed Louisiana procedural code from the Federal Rules will
be the motion for summary judgment, for which Louisiana has
no counterpart whatsoever. This most effective device, developed
originally by the more advanced American procedural codes,
but broadened and made more effective under the Federal
Rules, permits a litigant to test the correctness of the factual
allegations of his adversary's pleading, through the submission
by both parties in advance of trial of the affidavits showing
the evidence available in support of opposition thereto, and
enables the trial judge to render judgment summarily in cases
where no genuine issue of fact exists.
Louisiana's probate procedure, originally based upon the
succession procedure of France, probably will be retained in
simplified form, but with some borrowings from the Model
Probate Code drafted recently at the University of Michigan
in cooperation with the American Bar Association's Committee
on Model Probate Code.5 7
A change which may be claimed to reflect the influence of
Anglo-American law will be the new code's acceptance of the
common law terminology "jurisdiction" and "venue," in lieu of
53. See the Louisiana State Law Institute's pamphlet, Proposed Depositions and Discovery and Pretrial Procedure Statutes (May 8, 1952).
54. As La. Act 202 of 1952, incorporated into the Revised Statutes of
Louisiana of 1950 as Sections 3741 through 3794 of Title 13.

55. Op. cit. supra note 53.
56. As La. Act 84 of 1952,

incorporated into the Revised

Statutes of

Louisiana of 1950 as Section 5151 of Title 13 thereof. A narrower statute,
adopted earlier as La. Act 158 of 1950, and likewise
Rule 16, was repealed by the 1952 act.

57. See Simes, Model Probate Code (1946).

based upon Federal
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the civilian classification "jurisdiction ratione materiae" and
"jurisdiction ratione personae."58 , The paramount law of Louisiana, of course, is the Constitution of the United States. The
requirements of the due process and full faith and credit clauses
of the Federal Constitution to some extent are based upon the
common law concept of "jurisdiction over the person." The
latter has nothing in common with the continental "jurisdiction
ratione personae," of which "venue" is the common law counterpart. The new terms are being adopted to eliminate confusion
of nomenclature, but as virtually all of the former Louisiana
rules are being retained without substantial modification, this
represents merely a change of terminology.
Contemporary American procedure was not resorted to
exclusively in the search for more effective procedural devices
and principles. The incidental demand of intervention, originally
derived from Spanish procedure, is being broadened under
the new code to include the functions of the third opposition.
The latter, which had its source in French procedure, permits
a third party to intervene in pending proceedings, so as to
assert either a claim of ownership of, or a higher privilege on,
property under seizure. As it actually is a form of intervention, simplification of procedure required its merger with the
parent incidental demand. Perhaps a more formidable problem
in intervention was that due to the nebulous nature of the
present code provision on the juridical interest of the intervener, one which had been aggravated rather than solved by
the conflicting jurisprudence of the Louisiana courts. The most
acceptable solution of this problem was found in the provisions
of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure on voluntary intervention.5 9
Though the title on Actions has not yet been considered
by the Council, the great probabilities are that the concept of
cumulation of actions will be retained as being simpler and
more flexible than the common law joinder of actions and parties, 0 even as liberalized under the Federal Rules. If so, a
58. See the Louisiana State Law Institute's Expos6 des Motifs No. 3,
Book I, Preliminary Titles, Title II, Courts, Chapter 5, Venue (April 23,
1953).
59. Art. 105. In this connection, see the Louisiana State, Law Institute's
Expos6 des Motifs No. 7, Book II, Rules of Pleading and Practice in Ordinary Process, Title I, Pleading, pp. 74 and 75 (April 23, 1953).
60. For an excellent comparison of the common law rules of joinder
of actions and parties with those of cumulation of actions under the procedural law of the various continental countries, see Professor Robert
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specific rule as to when actions may be cumulated by plural
plaintiffs or against plural defendants (litis consortium) must
be included in the new code. The provisions of the German
Code of Civil Procedure61 appear to the Reporters to provide the
solution most acceptable to Louisiana practice. Further, cumulation of actions actually presents no difficulties of pleading,
but merely of trial. Hence, the trial judge should be left completely free to order the separate trials of the actions cumulated whenever he deems it advisable, and even in those rare
cases where the actions are cumulated properly, yet cannot
conveniently be tried together. The Reporters consequently
are recommending the adoption of a code provision based upon
the corresponding article 62 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure.
A number of drastic changes made to effect the simplification of Louisiana procedure, and to leave the decision in procedural matters in many instances to the discretion of the trial
judge, may possibly be attributed to the influence of both the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and of the more recent procedural codes of the continent. Conversely, changes made in
some important segments of Louisiana procedure, such as the
exceptions, incidental demands, executory process, the real
actions, and provisional remedies, are attributable to the influence of neither Anglo-American nor continental procedure,
but should be regarded as the indigenous and natural development of these devices through years of use in Louisiana practice.
CONCLUSIONS

The new Louisiana Code of Practice, like its predecessor
of 1825, will be the product of a synthesis of Anglo-American
and continental civil procedures. Opinions will vary as to whether
the influence of one or the other of these procedural systems
has predominated in shaping the Louisiana practice of the
future. The casual observer, noting instantly the pattern of
judicial organization and administration of Louisiana, its requirements of pleading, and its rules of discovery and production of evidence, pretrial and trial procedures, enforcement
of judgments, appellate practices and even its judicial techWyness Millar's essay, The Joinder of Actions in Continental Civil Procedure, 28 Ill. L. Rev. 26, 177 (1933).
61. Sections 59 and 60.
62. Art. 103.
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niques, will conclude that the new Louisiana Code of Practice
is essentially an Anglo-American code. The student of comparative civil procedure, however, discovering the Spanish and
French roots of the remaining bulk of Louisiana practice, will
arise from his study with the conclusion that, despite the continual lessening of the continental influence since 1825, it will
play the predominant role in shaping the future civil procedure
of Louisiana.
In the opinion of the writer, the accuracy of these variant
evaluations is academic. The result to be obtained under the
new procedural codification is the really important consideration; and here, it is believed, the results will justify the heavy
investment of time, money, and energy by the Louisiana State
Law Institute.
Louisiana need not apologize for its hybrid system of procedure. On the one hand, its French and Spanish heritage led
.to the retention of an essentially civilian system of substantive
private law; on the other, its membership in the American union
led to the adoption of systems of commercial and public law
definitely of English origin. It was more or less inevitable that
its civil procedure should reflect both Anglo-American and continental influences. The jurisprudential development of its procedure during the period 1850 to 1930 was in part aimlessthe result of the accidents of the lack of knowledge of foreign
languages and the greater availability of common law literature. The future procedural codification, like the Code of Practice of 1825, will result from careful evaluation of competing
procedural principles and devices, in order to select those which
will provide the most workable rules.
The pragmatic justification of comparative law is the opportunity for developing the law of the particular jurisdiction
through the borrowing of the most workable elements of competing legal systems. This is precisely what the Louisiana State
Law Institute is seeking to, accomplish in its redaction of the
new Louisiana Code of Practice.

